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PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION WITH
RISK AVERSION
W. KIP VISCUSI*

I.

INTRODUCTION

THE recent law and economics literature has directed much energy
toward identifying the various factors that determine whether parties will
litigate or settle accident claims.' The substantive interest in this area
rests in large measure on the obvious element of conflict in all these cases:
the plaintiff is trying to obtain reimbursement for his losses from the
defendant, which the defendant wishes to avoid paying. The strategic
structure of their interaction is quite complex because the outcomes of
bringing claims are heavily influenced by the costs, usually substantial, of
both bargaining and litigating. The game between plaintiff and defendant
is nonzero sum; indeed, it is negative sum. Playing it successfully requires
the parties to consider both the competitive and the cooperative elements
in their behavior.
The types of action that the parties can take in this environment are
quite diverse, as is illustrated by the product liability cases that are the
subject of this paper. Once a claim is filed, the claimant must decide
whether to pursue the claim to a court verdict, to drop the claim, or to
settle out of court. Going to court is a more costly battlefield, so the
incentive to settle out of court is very strong. If an out-of-court settlement
* Professor, Department of Economics, Northwestern University. This research was
supported in part by a grant from the Olin Foundation to the Center for the Study of the
Economy and the State, University of Chicago. Gregory M. Duncan, Patricia Danzon,
Jerome Culp, Michael Moore, and an anonymous referee provided helpful comments.
Among the major theoretical contributions to this area are papers by William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. Law & Econ. 61 (1971); Richard A. Posner,
An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. Legal Stud.
399 (1973); John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. Legal Stud. 279 (1973);
and Patricia Munch Danzon & Lee A. Lillard, Settlement Out of Court: The Disposition of
Medical Malpractice Claims, 12 J. Legal Stud. 345 (1983).
[Journal of Legal Studies, vol. XVII (January 1988)]
© 1988 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0047-2530/88/1701-0009501.50
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is an option, the claimant must decide how much he is willing to accept,
and the producer of the product involved must make an analogous decision.
In addition to being a sequential play game, the litigation process takes
on added interest since the mix of cases observed at each stage will be
determined by a nonrandom selection process.2 As a consequence, when
we observe patterns of behavior, such as the plaintiff's propensity to win
a suit, we must take into account that the mix of cases that we observe has
been influenced by decisions at an earlier stage either to settle or drop a
claim. Differences in the parties' risk aversion will affect this mix by
introducing an asymmetry into the payoffs of the two parties.
Although there have been a number of conceptual analyses of the litigation process, these studies have all made the simplifying assumption that
claimants and defendants are risk neutral. Because of the substantial
variation in possible payoffs from a claim, in practice the presence of a
payoff lottery rather than a certain reward for one's claim should be of
substantial consequence, particularly for claimants who are unable to
diversify their holdings.
The degree to which there is strong evidence of claimant risk aversion
also may affect how we view the current product liability crisis. The rising
frequency of product liability claims and increases in settlement levels
have made the legal system a prominent force in creating financial incentives for safer products. If, however, there is evidence of a dominant role
of risk aversion, so that claimants are willing to settle for much less than
their expected court award when the variance in the court outcomes is
large, then one might question the extent to which the legal system addresses claimants' needs. Strong evidence of risk aversion may also
change how we view the increased size of product liability awards, since,
even with recent increases, claimants will remain at a disadvantage if
there are differences in claimant and defendant risk aversion with respect
to the litigation lottery.
The extent to which evidence of risk aversion raises such doubts about
the efficacy of tort liability remedies for product-related injuries hinges in
large part on whether court-awarded verdicts are socially optimal. If these
verdicts are excessive, then a dampening of settlement levels below these
amounts would not necessarily lead to inadequate levels of compensation.
2 The seminal case selection paper is that of George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The
Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1984). For elaborations on this
approach and variations of it, see Donald Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for Trial
Biased? 14 J. Legal Stud. 185 (1985); and George L. Priest, Reexamining the Selection
Hypothesis: Learning from Wittman's Mistakes, 14 J. Legal Stud. 215 (1985). 1 present an
empirical exploration of these issues for the product liability case in W. Kip Viscusi, The
Determinants of the Disposition of Product Liability Claims and Compensation for Bodily
Injury, 15 J. Legal Stud. 321 (1986).
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Indeed, in this instance, risk aversion may serve to correct the excesses
of the tort liability system.
Risk aversion also has implications for the way in which we model
litigation behavior. In this paper, I will outline how the decisions to drop
and to settle a claim are affected by risk aversion, as well as how risk
aversion affects the settlement amounts.
The empirical tests of the role of risk aversion will entail the use of
a sample of over 10,000 closed product liability claims. The principal result is that both the expected awards and the variance in these awards
have the influence one would predict; the risk aversion of claimants is
greater than that of defendants. However, risk aversion does not appear
to be overly weighty. Rather, in terms of the magnitudes of the effects, it
is the expected rewards variable that is dominant, which suggests that risk
aversion does not play an overwhelming role in modifying claimants'
behavior.
II.

A

MODEL OF THE LITIGATION PROCESS WITH RISK AVERSION

The series of decisions involved in the litigation process can be analyzed by assuming optimizing behavior by the company that produced the
product as well as by the claimant, who, in this case, has suffered a
product-related loss. The most convenient procedure for analyzing the
series of decisions involved is to proceed using the standard dynamic
programming technique of backward induction. In particular, I will consider the final stages of the litigation process first and then investigate how
the outcomes at these stages are influenced by earlier decisions.
It should be emphasized that the model I am developing is by necessity
less complicated than some others that have appeared in the literature.
My purpose is to devise a framework that can be estimated empirically
rather than to produce an elaborate model that is of interest only because
of its theoretical structure. Thus, my intent is to structure the model in as
parsimonious a fashion as possible, while at the same time retaining
enough of the key elements of the theoretical structure to capture the
most salient aspects of the litigation process. Apart from the role of risk
aversion in the analysis and the introduction of factors pertinent to empirical estimation, the general spirit of the model developed below follows an
approach to the litigation decision that is broadly consistent with a substantial body of research in the law and economics field.
The Court Verdict
If the parties do not settle the claim, or if the plaintiff does not drop the
claim, the parties' rewards will be governed by the size of the court
verdict and the associated litigation costs. Consider first the rewards to
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the plaintiff. For simplicity, assume that the plaintiff perceives a probability p of winning the case and receiving an award V, and he has a probability I - p of losing the case. To generalize from this a distribution of
multiple possible payoff levels is straightforward, but complicates the
analysis unnecessarily. The defendant also incurs litigation costs C.
The court verdict is solely relevant in the influence it exerts on the
parties' expectations in previous stages of the claims process. The role of
claimant risk aversion does not enter the analysis of court outcomes
since, once a decision has been made to proceed to a verdict, the outcome
will not be affected by the degree of risk aversion.' Since I have considered the determinants of the probability of the claimant's winning a lawsuit and the magnitude of the court award for my sample of product
liability cases in my earlier product liability analysis, 4 I will focus in this
paper on the influence of risk aversion on the earlier stages of the claims
process.
If the plaintiff is risk neutral, the rewards associated with proceeding to
a court verdict will be governed by the expected payoff pV - C. The
presence of this lottery, and the possible high variability in the payoff, will
make a risk-averse plaintiff value going to court at an amount below its
expected value. More specifically, the certainty equivalent CE], of going
to court will be below the expected value by some insurance premium RI
or
CEt, = pV - C - R 1.

(1)

For purposes of the empirical estimation, I will assume that R, is related both to the variance of the payoffs 0 "2 and to the Pratt-Arrow 5 measure of absolute risk aversion A for this lottery by the relation
R,

(1/2)ur2A.

(2)

If claimants' preferences are characterized by constant absolute risk aversion, then the formulation above is valid regardless of the distribution of
payoffs to the litigation process.
In practice, the measure of absolute risk aversion might be decreasing
rather than constant, so that willingness to engage in legal lotteries might
increase with wealth. The absence of a claimant wealth variable in the
data set I will utilize necessitates the use of the formulation in equations
' The mix of cases that proceed to a court verdict will, of course, be affected by risk
aversion. I will analyze this influence through the effect of risk aversion on the incentive to
settle or drop claims.
' See Viscusi, supra note 2.
See John Pratt, Risk Aversion in the Small and the Large, 30 Econometrica 122 (1964);
and Kenneth Arrow, Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing (1971).
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(1) and (2). If there is not substantial heterogeneity in the wealth of the
claimants, this approach will provide a good approximation of what would
be found with a wealth-dependent measure. Moreover, the constant riskaversion assumption implies that the utility function is a negative exponential of the form a - be - dx , where X is the claimant's asset position. 6
This utility function is commonly used both in conceptual analyses and in
empirical applications, so that the framework adopted is well within the
usual practices in the empirical risk-economics literature. A final factor
leading to the adoption of this specification is that, if the payoffs are
distributed lognormally, and if preferences satisfy constant relative risk
aversion-thus permitting wealth-related variations in risk
aversion7
then one is also led to a formulation that is fairly similar.
The defendant in a product liability case is typically a large firm or its
insurer and, as a result, may be risk neutral when evaluating a lottery
involving even a potentially large claim of $1,000,000 or more.8 Even in
the case of a risk-averse firm, one would expect its insurance premium R 2
to be less than the claimant's value of R 1 . The value of R 2 will be governed
by a proportionality relation identical to that in equation (2) for R 1 , but we
should expect that empirically R, will exceed R 2 .
Let q be the firm's perceived probability that the claimant will win the
case, where q may equal p but need not. If D represents the firm's litigation costs, then the firm's certainty equivalent CE 2 , of going to court is
CE 2 , =

-qV

-

D

-

R2.

(3)

The Drop Decision
At various stages in the litigation process, the claimant must decide
whether to pursue his claim. Before going to court, the claimant must
decide whether it is worthwhile to incur the legal expenses involved. 9 The
claimant will drop the case if the certainty equivalent CE 1 c associated
with going to court is negative, or
6 For discussion of the utility function, see Ralph Keeney & Howard Raiffa, Decisions
with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Tradeoffs (1976), at 159-72.
7 The main difference is that it is the natural log of the certainty equivalent that will be
related to the mean and variance terms. For a discussion of this result in a different context,
see Michael J. Moore, Three Essays in Labor Economics (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation
Univ. Michigan, 1984), and, for empirical support of the constant relative risk aversion
assumption, see Marshall Blume & Irwin Friend, The Asset Structure of Individual Portfolios and Some Implications for Utility Functions, 30 J. Finance 585 (1975).
8 My implicit assumption is that the firm views this award in isolation, not as a precedent
that will affect future awards.
' The approach here simplifies the drop decision somewhat since the plaintiff also could
choose to drop the case after taking it to court, particularly if the trial is long.
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CEIt < 0.
This drop decision will be the focus of the empirical analysis.
Estimation of the drop probability is not straightforward, however,
since the components of CEI, are not directly observable. Instead, we will
use a proxy AVEPAYOFF for the term pV, a proxy VARPAYOFF for
the claimant's insurance premium term RI, and a vector of variables Z to
capture litigation costs and omitted aspects of the claimant's prospects.
Rather than observing CEIc, we observe related variables, so that
CE, = CE*C + ul

=

131AVEPAYOFF + [32VARPAYOFF + Z'13 3

+

u 1,

where ul is a random error term.
The drop probability will be given by
pr(DROP) = pr(-ul > CE]'c) = [1 + exp(-CE*])]

-

',

(4)

provided that the drop probability can be characterized by assuming a
logistic probability function.
The Settlement Decision
The claimant and defendant may settle the claim out of court if there is
a potential gain for both parties in doing so rather than in going to court.
In setting the reservation settlement level for this bargaining process, the
claimant will require a payment of at least CEIc, since he can earn this
certainty equivalent by going to court. If CEIe is negative, he can drop the
case. As a result, the claimant's reservation settlement S, is given by
SI = max(0, CE1 c).
For concreteness, I will focus on the situation where CE, is positive. A
claimant can potentially settle with the firm for a positive amount even
though his certainty equivalent of proceeding to court may be negative
since settlements need not be at the reservation settlement level. In that
instance, the pertinent S, value for the analysis below is zero, and the
results are modified accordingly.
The company's maximum offer S2 to the defendant equals what it expects to lose by going to court, in terms of the expected settlement, its
risk premium, and the associated court costs, or
S2 =

-CE

2, =

qV

+

D + R 2.

If S2 exceeds S1, there will be the potential for an out-of-court settlement
that will enhance the welfare of both parties. There is no assurance,
however, that such a settlement will be reached in practice. This analysis
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is based on the assumption that the parties will behave rationally in terms
of their own perceived rewards.
A necessary condition for the claim to be settled out of court is that

0

< S2

-

S1

= (q - p)V + R, + R 2 + C + D.

If the probabilistic beliefs regarding the claimant's chance of success are
identical, the expected court award serves simply as a transfer between
two parties and V nets out of the analysis. The presence of the claimant's
risk-premium term R 1 , and the defendant's risk-premium term R 2 , both
create an incentive for an out-of-court settlement, as do the two litigation
cost terms. Indeed, there will only be a desire to go to court if the claimant's perceived probability of success p exceeds the defendant's assessment q by a sufficient amount.
The values of S, and S2 are not directly observable, but we can establish
proxies for them as was done for CE, above. In particular, let
S1 = STI + u2 =

I34AVEPAYOFF + 135VARPAYOFF + Z113 6 + u2 ,

and
S2 = S2 + U3 = 137AVEPAYOFF +

I3sVARPAYOFF

+ Z2N + U3 ,

where AVEPAYOFF and VARPAYOFF are proxies for the expected
court award and its variance, and Z, and Z 2 are vectors of variables that
measure both the associated court costs and omitted aspects of the court
verdict not captured by AVEPAYOFF and VARPAYOFF.
The probability that the parties will settle the claim out of court is given
by

pr(SETTLE) = pr[u 2 -

U3 -- S2 -

STf,

or in terms of the logit equation to be estimated,
pr(SETTLE) = {1 + exp[-(137 - 134)]AVEPAYOFF
-

(138 -

P35)VARPAYOFF - Z,,j2 9

(5)
+ Z'13 6} - I .

Settlement Level
If the parties settle out of court and behave rationally, settlement level
will be in the range (SI,S2), assuming that S2 is not below S1 and that S, 0. Where they settle within this range will depend on the bargaining power
of the two parties. One can view the eventual settlement as being a
weighted average of Si and S2, where there is some weight w on S, and
I - w on S2 that reflects the parties' respective bargaining power. One
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can then write the observed settlement level PAY for the bodily injury
cases to be examined in this study as

PAY = wS, + (I - w)S2,
or

PAY = [wp + (1 - w)q]V - wR 1
+ (1 - w)R 2 - wC + (1 - w)D.

(6)

If parties have equal bargaining power (w = .5), and if the plaintiff's risk
premium is greater (that is, R, > R 2, as one would expect), then the net
effect of risk aversion will be to decrease observed settlement levels.
As before, we will utilize a set of variables that measures these components of PAY with some error, or

PAY = P310AVEPAYOFF + g 1 VARPAYOFF
1

+

Z3 1 2

+

u.

(7)

Early Drop Decisions
The claimant may choose to drop his claim at a very early stage. If
bargaining for an out-of-court settlement is costless, as has been modeled
above, the claimant will have no reason to drop his claim before it reaches
the stage of having to go to court. The extent of out-of-court negotiation
will vary with the particular circumstances, and the claimant may choose
not to pursue the claim further.
Suppose that the out-of-court bargaining is not costless but will impose
a cost G on the claimant. In addition, let s be the claimant's perceived
probability that an out-of-court settlement will be reached and 1 - s be
the probability that the case goes to court. Then the plaintiff will not
engage in bargaining in order to reach an out-of-court settlement if
0 > sPAY + (1 - s) max(0, CEIc) - G - R0,
where R 0 is some risk premium associated with this lottery. The role of
the substantive variables in such a decision will be similar to that in
equation (4) above. For example, higher values of AVEPAYOFF should
raise PAY and CE ,, lowering the DROP probability. VARPAYOFF will
have the opposite effect.
If settlement bargaining is viewed as being too costly, the parties proceed directly to the go-to-court/drop-case decision that takes the form
specified by equation (4) above, regardless of whether there is a decision
to engage in pretrial bargaining. As a result, there is no loss in generality
(in terms of the analysis of the drop decision) by focusing on a decision
made just before going to court. What is omitted from the analysis is an
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estimation of the decision to engage in bargaining to obtain an out-ofcourt settlement.
The Empirical Model
The empirical estimation will focus on three equations: the drop probability (eq. (4)), the settlement probability (eq. (5)), and the size of the outof-court settlement (eq. (7)). These are the three outcomes that will be
most directly affected by claimant risk aversion. Other issues could have
been addressed but have not. For example, one could explore how risk
aversion affected the mix of cases that went to trial and what the court
awards would have been had these cases been litigated. 10 Thus, the empirical analysis below does not reflect an exhaustive analysis of all of the
ramifications of risk aversion, but it does touch on the most prominent
manifestations of its influence.

III.

THE SAMPLE AND THE VARIABLES

The empirical analysis utilizes a very rich set of data on product liability
claims. The Insurance Services Office (ISO) Product Liability Closed
Claims Survey II used for the analysis includes information on the disposition of the claim, the size of the settlement, and other key variables in the
analysis. As in my earlier paper,' 2 my analysis will focus on the claims in
the sample involving bodily injury. Since the sample characteristics are
3
identical to those in my earlier paper, they will not be reported here.'
The sample for the survey was quite extensive, as it included data on
10,784 bodily injury claims from twenty-three insurance companies.
Claims were from all fifty states. They were closed between the latter half
of 1976 and mid-1977. This time period is after the advent of fundamental
changes in modern product liability doctrines and, in particular, the emergence of strict liability and the evolution in the concept of a design defect. 14 Nevertheless, the mass tort cases had not yet closed, so that the
'0 Apart from the role of risk aversion, the structure of these issues could be addressed
with the framework developed by Danzon & Lillard, supra note 1. However, for the reasons
discussed in Viscusi, supra note 2, 1 have chosen not to do so. Most important is that
exploration of this set of issues entails a number of restrictive assumptions.
" The data tapes used contain information that is summarized in a survey volume by the
Insurance Services Office, Product Liability Closed Claims Survey (1977).
12

See Viscusi, supra note 2.

'3 In particular, see the full sample statistics in table I of Viscusi. supra note 2.
"4 For a history of these developments, see Richard A. Epstein. Modern Products Liabil-

ity Law: A Legal Revolution (1980); and George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise
Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. Legal
Stud. 461 (1985).
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legal landscape of a decade ago was not identical to that of today. 15 Since
my focus is on claimants' responses to financial risks rather than on
liability doctrines per se, this continued evolution in product liability law
is not central to the analysis here.
The first decision analyzed is whether the claim was dropped, which is
captured by a 0 - 1 dummy variable (dv) DROP that takes on a value of
one if the claim is dropped. About one-fifth of all claims are dropped. The
most prevalent outcome is to settle the claim out of court, which is captured by the SETTLE dv. About three-fourths of all claims are resolved in
this fashion. The remaining claims are those that go to a court verdict-an
outcome that arises in only 4 percent of all cases.
The bodily injury compensation received by the claimant, which is
possibly zero, is given by PAY. On average, the claimants receive compensation just below $10,000. This actual rewards variable will be coupled
with two variables constructed using the health effect of the accident on
the individual.
These two explanatory variables are AVEPAYOFF, which is a proxy
for the expected court verdict, and VARPAYOFF, which is a proxy for
its variance. Since the claimant's insurance premium is a linear function
of the variance of the lottery outcomes (from eq. (2)), VARPAYOFF will
serve as a proxy for the insurance premium associated with the claim
payoff lottery.
The AVEPAYOFF and VARPAYOFF variables were constructed in
the following fashion. The expected court verdict pV was not the focus of
the analysis since the number of claims settled in court was small, and
there is a sample selection bias affecting such claims. Instead, I utilized
both court awards and out-of-court settlements. Out-of-court settlements
will differ from the court awards only by the role of the risk premiums if
legal costs and perceptions of the relative bargaining power of the parties
are identical (from eq. (6), where w = .5, and C = D). 16 Moreover, if the
'5 The claims performance in terms of the amount of compensation does not appear to
have changed greatly through 1979. For a comparison of the ISO data with 1979 statistics
compiled in the Alliance of American Insurers, Highlights of Large-Loss Product Liability
Claims (1980), see W. Kip Viscusi, Alternative Approaches to Valuing the Health Impacts of
Accidents: Liability Law and Prospective Evaluations, 46 J. L. & Contemp. Probs., 49, (No.
4, 1983). The emergence of mass tort claims and their effect is addressed by Richard Epstein, The Legal and Insurance Dynamics of Mass Tort Litigation, 13 J. Legal Stud. 475
(1984); and W. Kip Viscusi, Structuring an Effective Occupational Disease Policy: Victim
Compensation and Risk Regulation, 2 Yale J. Reg. 53 (1984).
16 Thus, the statistics reflect the expected payoff over all claims. If one wished to address
the more difficult issues, such as what a settled claim might have received had it gone to
court, one can use the more complex structural model described in Danzon & Lillard, supra
note 1.
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risk premiums are also identical, settlements will equal expected court
awards.
These dollar values were then matched to nineteen accident categories
(for example, poisonings, lacerations), each of which was segmented into
two groups-fatal and nonfatal accidents. For each health-mortality status category, I constructed the average payoff to the claimant (AVEPAYOFF) and its variance (VARPAYOFF), which served as the key
financial reward variables in the empirical analysis. To facilitate the reporting of the results, VARPAYOFF is the variance of the health category's payoffs multiplied by 10-8.17
It should be emphasized that use of AVEPAYOFF and particularly of
VARPAYOFF as proxies for the individual's perceived expected awards
and awards variance involves substantial measurement error. The empirical measure being used reflects the nationwide variation rather than simply the local variation. Since these are likely to be important regional
differences in law, in the odds of successful litigation for a given injury,
and in the awards levels, the VARPAYOFF measure will overstate the
true variance in any particular state. A second source of bias, which
operates in the opposite direction, is that, to the extent that settlements
are influenced by risk aversion, the VARPAYOFF measure will already
imbed the net influence of the claimant's and the defendant's risk aversion, biasing the measure downward if claimant risk aversion is of greater
consequence.
No previous analysis has investigated the effect of the VARPAYOFF
variable or other related measures of the dispersion in outcomes. The
mean rewards have received more scrutiny in the medical malpractice
literature. There, notably, Danzon and Lillard 18 found that increases in
the level of the potential verdict increased claimants' reservation acceptance values, raised defendants' maximum offer amounts, and raised the
overall settlement size. The results developed here on the basis of product
liability cases indicate that there is also the expected effect on specific
components of the litigation process and that the variance of the awards is
also consequential.
The explanatory variables also include measures related to the likely
economic loss associated with the health outcome, the costs associated
with litigating a claim, and the legal prospects of the case, all of which
affect both the probability of a claimant's success and his likely litigation
costs. The variables of this type were the claimant's age (AGE), whether
17 The mean value of AVEPAYOFF is $9,995.01, and its standard deviation is 18,375.3,
whereas, for VARPAYOFF, the mean value is 49.0, and its variance is 103.9.
18 See Danzon & Lillard (1983).
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the claimant was male (MALE dv), and whether the claimant was married
(MARR dv).
Only 13 percent of all claims are job related. Since workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy in the case of workers injured because of
actions by the employer, these product liability claims are typically thirdparty lawsuits. For example, a worker suffering from asbestosis contracted while working in an automobile brake factory can sue the asbestos
manufacturer. Many work-related product liability claims are filed by the
employers acting under the subrogation rights rather than by the worker.
In the case of a claim on behalf of the victim of a fatal accident
(DEATH dv), the health effect is both severe and unambiguous, thus
strengthening the validity of the case. A death may have the opposite
influence as well if there are no heirs to press the case or if there are no
individuals who would suffer financial losses that need compensation. In
contrast, if the injury involves scarring (SCAR dv) there is a clear-cut
injury that goes beyond the financial loss, and the injured party is able to
pursue the claim. Scarring also presents visible evidence to support possible compensation for pain and suffering.
One monetary variable that was included may serve as a proxy for
nonmonetary, legal concerns. If the claimant has received collateral private insurance payments for his injury already (COLLATERAL dv), such
payments might be a signal of a legitimate claim. They also indicate that
the claimant has filed multiple claims for the same injury, possibly joining
as defendants firms with only a tangential relation to the injury.
Several legal variables were also examined. By far, the most important
was the legal basis for the claim-whether it was based on strict liability (STRICT dv), absolute liability (ABSOLUTE dv), negligence (NEGLECT dv), or breach of warranty, which was always omitted from the
equations to prevent singularities. Absolute liability is a little-used liability criterion that permits no defenses to defeat liability. The recent emergence of strict liability principles is generally believed to boost the claimant's chance of success and to lower the costs associated with proving its
case.' 9 Chief among the other legal variables also included is whether the
product was in violation of OSHA or CPSC standards. Evidence of such
violations enhances the claimant's prospects of ultimate success since the
law gives an advantage to claimants in situations of statutory violations. 21
The REG dv used to capture these regulatory effects assumed a value of
one if the product violated either set of regulations and was zero otherwise. A related dummy variable (DESIGN) took on a value of one only if
'9 W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keaton on the Law of Torts (5th ed. 1984).
Id. at 220-33.

20
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the product suffered from design defects, which will capture the specific
role of this legal criterion that has undergone considerable change in
recent years.
IV.

THE DECISIONS TO DROP OR SETTLE A CLAIM

Because of the discrete zero-to-one nature of the DROP variable, the
DROP probability equation was estimated using a maximum likelihood
estimation technique. The logit results are reported for two specifications
in Table 1. The first equation includes only an intercept and the two
financial rewards variables-AVEPAYOFF and VARPAYOFF. The second equation adds a detailed set of personal characteristic and legal variables. The rationale for adding these variables is that AVEPAYOFF and
VARPAYOFF are based only on the distribution of outcomes for par-

TABLE I
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF THE DROP
PROBABILITY EQUATION*

COEFFICIENTS (Asymptotic

1

SEs)

2

Independent variables:

AVEPAYOFF
VARPAYOFF

- 5.28E-6
(2.70E-6)
6.56E-5
(45.02E-5)

- 1.32E-5
(.36E-5)
1.03E-3
(.51 E-3)

MARR

-...246

(.053)
REG

...

JOB

...

-. 574

(.078)

..
COLLATERAL

.394

..

(.078)

..

(.522)

(.063)
SCAR

...

DEATH

...
...
...

ABSOLUTE

...
STRICT

...

...
NEGLECT

-2

...

Log likelihood

10516.6

-. 457

(.071)
.293
(.165)
- .067

(.232)
.058
(.069)
.305
(.065)
10270.0

* Other variables included were an intercept in eq. (1) and AGE,
MALE, and STATE in eq. (2).
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ticular injury categories. Thus, they do not fully reflect all the factors
influencing the plaintiffs' and defendants' decisions. Inclusion of these
other influences may, hovever, also pick up some of the influence of the
financial rewards variables, so that examination of the more parsimonious
equation (1) in Table 1 is also instructive.
The most consistently powerful influence on the DROP probability is
the AVEPAYOFF variable, as health effects associated with larger expected rewards are less likely to be dropped by the claimants. The effect
is statistically significant and in the expected direction. The VARPAYOFF variable should boost the incentive to drop the case if the claimant is
risk averse. This variable has the expected positive influence but only
passes the usual tests of statistical significance in equation (2) in Table 1
once the legal and personal characteristics variables are added. The additional variables in equation (2) capture omitted determinants of both the
expected rewards and the litigation costs.
Nevertheless, even in equation (2), it is the expected rewards that are
the more important concern. The mean effect of the AVEPAYOFF on the
DROP probability is over two times as great as the effect of VARPAYOFF evaluated at its mean. The role of risk aversion in affecting the
DROP probability is statistically significant but not dominant in its influence. Its effect is less than half of that of the mean rewards.
The other variables included in equation (2) perform in the expected
fashion. Married claimants are less likely to drop a claim because a variety of related influences may be at work. Married claimants are more
likely to have a spouse to assist in pursuing a claim (particularly after a
fatality), and the presence of a spouse and family boosts the expected
court award to the extent that these awards are based on the objective of
adequate compensation of one's survivors. The age and sex of the claimant were inconsequential, with effects much smaller than the associated
standard errors.
Several legal variables were particularly instrumental. Variables that
should both increase the probability of a successful claim and reduce the
litigation costs should lower the DROP probability. The two statistically
significant variables with the expected negative influence were whether
the product violated government safety regulations (REG) and whether
the injury involved any scarring (SCAR). Scarring provides visible evidence of an injury as well as the basis for possible compensation for pain
and suffering.
Significant variables with expected effects in the opposite direction
included JOB, COLLATERAL, DEATH, and NEGLECT. Job-related
cases are more likely to be dropped because of the greater difficulty in
proving the applicability of product liability remedies rather than work-
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TABLE 2
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF THE
PROBABILITY EQUATION*

COEFFICIENTS

Independent variables:
AVEPAYOFF
VARPAYOFF

SETTLE

(Asymptotic SEs)

1

2

-2.33E-5
(.33E-5)
2.13E-3
(.64E-3)

- 1.30E-5
(.37E-5)
1.20E-3
(.67E-3)
- .171

MARR

...
. .

(.111)

REG

...

-. 0018
(.1286)

JOB

...

-. 291

(.138)
-...427
(.118)

COLLATERAL
SCAR

...

DEATH

...

ABSOLUTE
STRICT

...
..
...

NEGLECT

...

ASSUME

...

-2 Log likelihood

3378.4

- .636

(.112)
- .860
(.184)
.661
(.498)
.242
(.131)
.310)
(.130)
- .488
(.127)
3234.4

* Both eqq. included an intercept, and eq. (2) also included AGE,
MALE, and STATE.

ers' compensation. Collateral payments similarly boost the DROP probability insofar as they are an index of multiple lawsuits, where the existence of other compensation indicates the more tenuous nature of this
particular claim. In addition, subrogation rules may lead to a reduction in
compensation from one source if the multiple claims are successful. Finally, negligence-based claims (NEGLECT) are more likely to be
dropped, which is consistent with the general perception that this approach is less advantageous than strict liability theories.
For claims that are not dropped, the next discrete choice is whether to
settle the claim before trial. The estimates of the SETTLE probability
equation (5) of Section II, which are presented in Table 2, also yield
effects consistent with an optimizing litigation model. The estimation re-
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suits indicate that increases in AVEPAYOFF have a consistent negative
effect, which one would expect if the claimant's perceived chance of
success in a lawsuit exceeds that of the firm, so that increasing the stakes
boosts the relative amount of optimism for the claimant. Thus, not only
does the expected award affect litigation behavior but the asymmetry in
the expectations is evident as well.
Unlike in the DROP result, where the variance in rewards was not
influential in the first equation, VARPAYOFF has a positive effect on
SETTLE that is statistically significant in both cases. Risk-averse claimants are expected to be more willing to settle claims associated with a
large payoff variance out of court. Moreover, unlike the DROP results,
risk aversion on the part of defendants is also of consequence; it is the
combined influence of risk aversion on the part of plaintiffs and defendants-each of which has positive effects on the settlement probabilitythat will be of consequence.
The mean effect of the AVEPAYOFF variable is double that of VARPAYOFF, which represents some narrowing of their relative influence
compared with the DROP results in Table 1.21 This comparatively stronger role of VARPAYOFF is what one would expect given the theoretical
structure of equations (4) and (5) in Section II. In each case, VARPAYOFF's coefficient is linked to how this variable affects the claimant's
certainty equivalent CE, of going to court. In the case of the DROP
results, AVEPAYOFF's role was also linked to how it affected CEic,
whereas for the SETTLE results it is the differential effect of VARPAYOFF on CE, and CE 2, that matters. In the case of identical perceived
claimant success probabilities (p = q), the AVEPAYOFF variable would
drop out altogether. In addition, both parties' risk aversion boosts the
settlement probability, whereas only the claimant's risk aversion affects
the probability that the case is dropped. The narrower difference between
the effect of AVEPAYOFF and VARPAYOFF on SETTLE as compared
with DROP consequently is an additional result consistent with the theoretical predictions.
From equation (5) in Section II, we know that the other variables included in the equation will have an influence dependent on two sets of
factors. First, to the extent that the variable raises the costs of litigation
for either party, it will increase the settlement probability. Second, the
settlement probability will also increase as the firm's expectation of the
21 The negative sign of the AVEPAYOFF variable in the SETTLE equation also is consistent with the prediction of several litigation models that higher stakes reduce the likelihood
of settlement. See Posner, supra note 1; Danzon and Lillard, supra note 1; and Wittman,
supra note 2.
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court award increases relative to that of the plaintiff. Some of the signs of
the independent variables will be difficult to predict a priori since they
may affect the different components of the settlement determinants in
possibly conflicting fashion.
To the extent that litigation costs are less for married claimants because
of the presence of a spouse to assist in pressing the claim, one would
expect a negative effect on SETTLE. The negative coefficient that is
observed is statistically significant at the 90 percent level (one-tailed test).
Married claimants also might expect greater financial compensation because of their greater financial needs, and the net effect of this influence
will also be negative, provided that married claimants have a higher perceived probability of success p than the firm's perception of this probability.
Job-related claims are much less likely to be settled out of court because the firm's perception that such claims have a low chance of success
apparently plays a dominant role. Likewise, claims for which collateral
payments have already been received are less likely to be settled. Collateral payments reduce the costs to the claimant of future litigation, decreasing the settlement probability. Moreover, if these claims are viewed
as being more tenuous, and there is a differential effect on the firm in
terms of lowering the perceived chance of a large court award for the
claimant, then there will also be the observed negative influence.
Two attributes that may greatly increase the plaintiff's expectations of
an ultimate court award are the presence of scarring (SCAR) or a fatality
(DEATH). In each case, there is a significant negative effect on the likelihood of an out-of-court settlement, which apparently is either an indication of a greater effect on the claimant's expectations than on the firm's or
else a likely reduction in the litigation costs associated with health effects
of a more visible nature.
All of the three principal variables for the legal basis of the claimABSOLUTE, STRICT, and NEGLECT-are positive, although ABSOLUTE's coefficient has a large standard error because of the few cases
involved. On balance, these variables have a combined positive effect on
SETTLE, so that the omitted dummy variable for claims on breach of
warranty grounds has a negative effect. 22 Warranty-based arguments are
generally believed to be the weakest, so the lower value of SETTLE
reflects the lower chance such claims have of receiving compensation of
any kind. For similar reasons, situations in which the firm can make
arguments regarding assumption of risk (ASSUME) or related contribu22 For a fuller discussion of warranty-based claims than that given below, see George L.
Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 Yale L. J. 1297 (1981).
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tory negligence arguments are less likely to be settled out of court by the
firm.
V.

THE LEVEL OF OUT-OF-COURT SETTLEMENTS

As indicated by equations (6) and (7) in Section II, the level of out-ofcourt settlements will be driven by the same types of economic concerns
as were the decisions to settle or drop a particular case. To reduce the
possibly distortive effect of outliers on the results, I utilized the natural
logarithms of PAY, AVEPAYOFF, and VARPAYOFF as the main financial variables. 23
Table 3 summarizes the findings for the effect of the principal financial
variables, both with and without the inclusion of the set of other attributes. 24 Both equations yield the expected relation. Higher levels of expected rewards AVEPAYOFF should boost the level of out-of-court settlements (PAY), and this effect is almost exactly a one-to-one relation in
the equation including only the two financial rewards variables. Increases
in the variance of rewards will diminish the expected settlement level
since risk-averse claimants will be willing to accept a certain reward that
becomes lower as the variance of the likely outcomes increase. This effect
is also borne out.
In each case, the magnitude of the effects is reduced for equation (2) as
additional, related explanatory variables are added. The earlier pattern of
the AVEPAYOFF variable playing a more consequential role than the
VARPAYOFF variable is even stronger for the results in Table 3. The
mean effect of AVEPAYOFF is roughly nine times as great as the mean
effect of VARPAYOFF for equation (I), with an even greater disparity for
equation (2).
Although the mean level of awards is more influential than is the variance, the VARPAYOFF variable is statistically significant in each equation. The fact that VARPAYOFF has a negative effect on payments is of
substantial economic interest since this result arises when the risk premium of the claimant exceeds that of the defendant, where the role of
23 This use of the semilogarithmic specification is done in both Danzon & Lillard, supra
note 1, for medical malpractice claims, and, in Viscusi, supra note 2, for product liability
claims.
24 The overall fit of eq. (2) in Table 3 is somewhat below that (R 2 difference of .02) in table
6 of Viscusi, supra note 2. The inclusion of AVEPAYOFF, VARPAYOFF, and several
other variables (AGE, MALE, SCAR, and DEATH) leads to less predictive power than the
use of the actual bodily injury loss and the square of this value. The fact that the actual claim
variable performs slightly better than a national predicted average and variance of claims is
not surprising, given the direct relation of claimed losses to awards. It should be noted that
the fit of the DROP and SETTLE equations reported in this paper is superior to those in
Viscusi, supra note 2.
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TABLE 3
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR

In(Pay)

EQUATIONS

COEFFICIENTS (SEs)

Independent variables:
In(AVEPAYOFF)
ln(VARPAYOFF)

1

2

1.192
(.061)
- .312
(.032)

.445
(.068)
-. 066
(.033)
.246
(.054)
.246
(.054)
.283
(.069)
.906
(.089)
.637
(.071)
.979
(.069)
1.103
(.165)
.447
(.198)
.535
(.066)
.219
(.064)

.10
48,874

.19
43,875

MALE
MARR
REG
JOB
COLLATERAL
SCAR
DEATH
ABSOL
STRICT
NEGLECT
fi2

SSR

* Each eq. also included a constant term, and eqq. (2) and (3) included
AGE, STATE, DESIGN and ASSUME.

each risk-aversion term is weighted by the party's respective bargaining
power (see eq. (6) in Section II). Claimant risk aversion is consequently
more influential than defendant risk aversion.
The inclusion of the legal and personal characteristic variables captures
in part the determinants of settlement levels and reduces the effects of
AVEPAYOFF and VARPAYOFF accordingly. Payment levels increase
for those who are married or male, which is a reflection of the higher
earnings of this group. Court awards are based primarily on the earnings
that have been lost because of death or injury, thus generating the observed relation.
Two surprising results are the positive effects of JOB and COLLATERAL on payment levels. In each case, these variables had a negative
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influence on whether the parties were likely to settle out of court. Although such claims are less likely to be settled, if settled, they are likely to
be settled for greater amounts, controlling for the expected payoff level
and its variance. Such a pattern is consistent with a situation in which
there is substantial heterogeneity in the legitimacy of the claims.
Cases involving scarring or a fatality are more likely to be settled for a
larger amount. In each case, these variables serve as an index of the
accident's severity and reflect, at least in part, the same types of influences captured by AVEPAYOFF and VARPAYOFF. The SCAR and
DEATH variables have additional nonfinancial implications as well, since
they represent tangible physical evidence that there was an adverse health
effect, thus facilitating the injured parties' pursuance of the claim.
Of the principal legal criteria on which one can base a claim, the strongest effects are for STRICT and ABSOLUTE. These effects are consistent
with the higher chance of success that such claims based on strict liability
principles have. The second strongest legal criterion-negligence-based
(NEGLECT) cases-has a smaller positive effect, and the omitted
dummy variable for warranty-based cases is negative. As with the explicit
financial rewards variables, these variables also perform in the expected
manner.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Situations involving litigation are a paradigmatic case of bargaining
conflict. The parties' interests are opposed, but there are some shared
interests as well. Moreover, in the situation in which at least one of the
parties is risk averse, there are additional potential gains of trade since
out-of-court bargaining will serve an insurance function for the parties
who might otherwise have faced a random court lottery.
The empirical results were consistent with an economic model of optimizing litigation and bargaining behavior, where the issues examined
were the claimant's decision to drop a claim, the joint decision to settle a
claim out of court, and the level of such out-of-court settlements. An
economic approach to litigation is a fruitful analytical device for interpreting the role of not only the financial effect variables but also the legal and
personal characteristic variables.
The primary focus of the empirical analysis was on the effect of the
expected value of a claim and its variance on behavior. In all cases, the
expected payoff played an instrumental role in influencing behavior, as
one would expect, given the key role that this variable has had in models
of litigation behavior. Moreover, the expected award had from two to
nine times the influence as did the variance, depending on the particular
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issue involved. Risk aversion plays a statistically significant role but is by
no means the major force that drives behavior in product liability cases.
Claimant risk aversion has a greater empirical influence than any possible
risk aversion on the part of defendants.
Proper recognition of this role of risk aversion in conceptual models
poses no great difficulties. Most of the conventional results can be
amended with the addition of risk-premium terms to the analysis.
In terms of the policy implications with respect to the functioning of the
judicial system for product liability claims, the differential role of claimant
risk aversion does not appear to put claimants at a substantial bargaining
disadvantage. Perhaps in large part because of the prevalence of contingent fee arrangements-which greatly limit the risk exposure of the claimant-the dominant concern of claimants is their expected payoff rather
than uncertainty regarding the level of such an award. The findings, while
important, do not require any substantial modifications in the conceptual
models used to analyze litigation strategies. In most instances, it should
suffice to amend the analysis by introducing a risk premium into the
analysis.
The policy implications of these findings are also of real importance. In
many discussions, it has been asserted that the risk aversion places injured parties at a substantial bargaining disadvantage for which legal
countermeasures might be appropriate. This study indicates that the fear
is overstated. The dominant concern of tort claimants is their expected
payoff and not their uncertainty regarding the level of the award. The
explanations for this outcome are not altogether clear, but it may have a
good deal to do with the well-nigh universal contingent fee arrangement,
which allows the injured party to transfer some portion of the risk to the
lawyer, who in turn can diversify risk by handling a portfolio of claims at
any single time. But, whatever the complete explanation, the risk aversion of claimants is not the dominant feature in product liability litigation.
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